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I. Introduction 
Hurricane Sandy caused an estimated $65 billion in economic losses to residences, 
business owners and infrastructure owners.1 It is the second most costly natural disaster 
in recent years in the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but it is not an 
outlier; economic and insured losses from devastating natural catastrophes in the United 
States and worldwide are climbing. According to Munich Re,2 real-dollar economic 
losses from natural catastrophes alone increased from $528 billion (1981-1990), $1,197 
billion (1991-2000) to $1,23 billion (2001-2010). During the past ten years, the losses 
were principally due to hurricanes and resulting storm surge occurring in 2004, 2005, and 
2008. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the direct economic losses and the insured portion 
from great natural disasters over the period 1970-2011.2 
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FIGURE 1. NATURAL CATASTROPHES WORLDWIDE 1980-2011. OVERALL AND INSURED LOSSES  
WITH TREND ($ BILLION) 
Sources: Munich Re Geo Risks Research  
Extreme events highlight the challenges in encouraging residents in hazard-prone areas to 
protect themselves against future disaster losses. A 1974 survey of more than 1,000 
California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas revealed that only 12 percent of the 
respondents had adopted any protective measures.3 Fifteen years later, there was little 
change despite the increased public awareness of the earthquake hazard.  In a 1989 
survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 
to 9 percent of the respondents in these areas reported adopting any loss reduction 
measures.4  Residents in flood-prone areas have demonstrated a similar reluctance to 
invest in mitigation measures.5,6   
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Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a large number of residents 
had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures with respect to 
their property, nor had they undertaken emergency preparedness measures. A survey of 
1,100 adults living along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts undertaken in May 2006 revealed 
that 83 percent of the responders had taken no steps to fortify their home, 68 percent had 
no hurricane survival kit and 60 percent had no family disaster plan.7   
A survey of nearly 800 residents in coastal counties during Hurricane Irene in 2011 
revealed that less than half of storm shutter owners in the state of New York actually 
installed them to protect their windows before the hurricane came. The others did not 
because it would have “taken too long.” This is an interesting example of mitigation 
measures being purchased but not utilized.8     
On the positive side, 89 percent of respondents of this survey in North Carolina and 88 
percent in New York indicated doing at least one storm preparation activity (e.g., buying 
water and food reserves and batteries). But these are short-term preparation actions that 
required limited effort. Many fewer households undertake protective measures when 
preparedness requires considerable foresight, effort and capital.  
Key decision makers who authorize development of hazard-prone areas after dams or 
levees are built may unintentionally reinforce this behavior. There is compelling evidence 
that residents moving into these areas feel completely safe, when in fact, they are still at 
risk for catastrophes should the dam or levee be breached or overtopped.9 If a 
catastrophic disaster occur, the damage is likely to be considerably greater than would 
have occurred had the lower but still positive level of risk been correctly perceived. This 
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behavior with its resulting consequences has been termed the levee effect. Public officials 
exacerbate the problem by not enforcing building codes and imposing zoning restrictions. 
A graphic example highlighting this point is the development of New Orleans following 
Hurricane Betsy in 1965 after the Corps of Engineers agreed to build massive hurricane 
protection levees to surround New Orleans and nearby communities. The city planning 
commission approved new subdivisions between 1967 and 1972 in areas that had been 
flooded by Betsy.10 
II. Why Are Those at Risk Reluctant to Invest in Loss Reduction Measures?  
Consider the following two illustrative scenarios: 
Example 1:  The Anderson family recently moved to a community that is subject to 
flooding, and has been asked by a local company whether they want to invest $1,500 to 
flood-proof their house so it is less susceptible to water damage. They are told that 
hydrologists have estimated that the annual chance of a severe flood affecting their home 
is 1/100 and that should such a disaster occur, flood-proofing their home will reduce their 
damage from what it would have been by $40,000. The family is not willing to incur this 
cost because they are not really that worried about the likelihood of flooding, even when 
offered an opportunity to look at the data.  
Example 2: The Benson family has lived in the same community in a house identical to 
the Andersons for many years. They are concerned about the flood problem, and have 
looked at the data, but feel they are not in a financial position to incur the $1,500 upfront 
cost of flood-proofing because of budget constraints. They are postponing this decision 
“until next year” as they have in previous years.  
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These examples highlight two key problems in getting people to invest in cost-effective 
risk-reduction measures:   
1. People chose to ignore the chance of future flood damage (“It will not happen to 
me”), even when they are provided with scientific information on the risk  
 
2. The expected benefits from mitigation over the expected life of the house, do not 
justify the high upfront cost today, given other pressing demands on the budget.  
Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty  
A key challenge in taking steps to reduce losses from natural disasters is to recognize the 
limitations of public and private decision makers in dealing with risk and uncertainty and 
then design incentives that help them make more informed and efficient choices. 
Many of the biases and simplified decision rules that characterize human judgment and 
choice under uncertainty reflect automatic, emotional non-analytic thinking.11  In this 
regard, risk is often treated as a feeling rather than as a statistical concept.12  While 
intuitive perceptions of risk are relatively accurate over a broad range of situations, they 
can lead to systematic deviations from expert assessments, especially for unfamiliar risks 
that involve small probabilities and high degrees of uncertainty but do not trigger natural 
reactions of dread.  The risk associated with natural hazards falls into this category.   
Logical assessments of risk, such as probability estimation, and Bayesian updating, 
require considerable time and attention.  If the Andersons or Bensons in our examples 
were to use analytic processes to make better decisions, they would have weighed the 
upfront investment in flood proofing their home against the expected discounted benefits 
	   7	  
over time in the form of reduced losses from future disasters and found the measure to be 
cost-effective.  
This paper suggests ways of addressing and overcoming this challenge: coupling long-
term strategies for managing disasters with short-term incentives so that those at risk are 
willing to undertake the required measures now. 
Behavioral Factors Impeding Adoption of Mitigation Measures 
There is considerable evidence indicating that individuals do not make efficient tradeoffs 
between expected costs and benefit.13  The simplest explanation as to why individuals fail 
to invest in adaptation and mitigation measures in the face of transparent risks is lack of 
affordability. If the Bensons have limited disposable income after purchasing necessities, 
limited credit and no way to borrow at reasonable interest rates, they would choose not to 
make these investments.  
The Benson’s decision to avoid making this investment is reinforced by their focusing on 
the upfront costs of risk reduction measures relative to the delayed benefits of suffering 
less damage from floods that might occur in the future. 14,15 Even before making this 
tradeoff, individuals residing in harm’s way may decide not to undertake mitigation 
measures if the likelihood of the disaster is below their threshold level of concern. In a 
laboratory experiment on purchasing insurance, many individuals bid zero for insurance 
coverage against low probability events, apparently viewing the probability of a loss as 
sufficiently small that they were not interested in protecting themselves against it.16  This 
may explain why the Anderson family did not invest in loss mitigation measures.. 
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III. The Role of Insurance in Incentivizing Mitigation  
Insurance, as a risk sharing mechanism, can play an important role in linking mitigation 
with financial protection should a disaster occur.  People often buy insurance that makes 
good economic sense.  They buy property insurance on their homes. They buy collision 
insurance on their new cars.  They buy life insurance if they have dependents.  But 
insurance against extreme events, such as floods and earthquakes, poses problems 
because these events are rarely experienced. People tend to ignore them or be unaware of 
their consequences until it is too late.   
Yet insurance, if priced properly, delivers the greatest value precisely in cases of 
relatively rare events that can cause large losses: high benefits in the form of claim 
payments in return for relatively low premiums paid over time. The insurance premium 
itself can act as a powerful signal as to the likelihood of a loss in the face of individual 
attempts to ignore the risk. Insurance also has the potential to encourage investment in 
loss reduction measures through premium discounts reflecting expected reduced claims 
following a disaster.17  
Guiding Principles for Insurance 
For insurance to play these important roles we propose the following three guiding 
principles. 
Principle 1: Premium reflecting risk.   Insurance premiums should reflect risk to signal to 
individuals how safe they are and what preventive or protective measures will reduce 
their vulnerability to property losses. Risk-based premiums should also reflect the cost of 
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capital that insurers need to integrate into their pricing to assure adequate competitive 
returns to their investors. 
Principle 1 provides a clear signal of the expected damage cost to those currently residing 
in areas subject to natural disasters and those considering moving into these regions. 
Insurers will also have an economic incentive to reduce premiums to homeowners and 
businesses investing in cost-effective loss-reduction measures, and those at risk will have 
an economic incentive to implement those measures.  
On the other hand, if insurance is poorly designed and premiums are unrelated to risk or 
to changes in risk, individuals are likely to underinvest in loss reduction measures. For 
example, if high risk premiums are heavily subsidized, this will lead to an 
underinvestment in mitigation because the premium reduction for undertaking this 
investment would be smaller than it should be or even zero.  
Insurance commissioners in several states have constrained premiums in hurricane-prone 
coastal regions by either suppressing the rates private insurers may charge and/or by 
providing coverage at distorted premiums through state organizations. The most extreme 
example is Florida. Through its state-operated insurance company, Citizens Property 
Insurance Corporation, homeowners residing in hurricane-prone areas pay highly 
subsidized rates that undercut private insurers’ premiums. Over the past eight years, 
Citizens has ballooned to become the state’s largest insurer, with about 1.4 million 
policies at the beginning of 2013.18   
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If Principle 1 is applied in hazard-prone areas where premiums are currently subsidized, 
some residents will be faced with large price increases. This concern leads to the second 
guiding principle. 
Principle 2:  Dealing with equity and affordability issues.   Any special treatment given to 
consumers at risk should come from means-tested, tax-financed insurance vouchers and 
not through cross-subsidized insurance premiums. 
Principle 2 is important if individuals residing in hazard-prone areas find that their 
premiums increase considerably when rates become risk-based. For some homeowners, 
higher premiums will impose an unexpected financial burden should they purchase a 
policy voluntarily or be required to do so. For these reasons, insurance vouchers financed 
by general taxation (not by higher premiums paid by lower risk individuals), may be the 
best way to make the risk-based rates equitable.  Note that Principle 2 applies only to 
those individuals who currently reside in hazard-prone areas. Those who decide to locate 
in the area should be charged premiums that reflect the risk. 
  
Principle 3: Multi-year insurance. To overcome myopia and encourage investment in 
preventive and protective measures, insurers should design multi-year contracts with 
fixed annual premiums.  
Today, property insurance contracts are issued on an annual basis which discourages 
long-term thinking. Multi-year insurance contracts would benefit homeowners by 
assuring them coverage at reasonable premiums following a catastrophe.  With annual 
contracts, insurers may discontinue coverage for some policyholders in high-hazard areas 
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following catastrophic losses, particularly if state regulators do not allow them to increase 
premiums.  An advantage of multi-year contracts for insurers is a decrease in their 
marketing costs as they do not have to concern themselves with renewal of policies. It 
also reduces the variance with respect to claims payments since insurers are now 
diversifying their risk across time as well as across policyholders.  
Multi-year insurance can be implemented only if insurers are permitted to charge prices 
that reflect long-term risk, and to adjust these premiums over time if risk changes. Today 
indeed, insurance premiums in many states are restricted to be artificially low in hazard-
prone areas, contributing to the non-marketability of multi-year insurance for protecting 
homeowners’ properties against losses from large-scale natural disasters. In addition, 
uncertainty regarding costs of capital and changes in risk over time deters insurers from 
extending their contracts beyond a single year.  
Encouraging Investment in Loss Reduction Measures 
The above three insurance principles should make it financially attractive for those at risk 
to invest in mitigation measures, particularly if the insurance policy is coupled with a 
home improvement loan so that the upfront costs of the loss-reduction investment is 
spread over a few years.   
Suppose the Anderson family and the Benson family are required to buy an insurance 
policy as a condition for their mortgage.  Assume also that the premiums reflect risk 
(Principle 1). The policy is a 5-year contract with annual premiums stable over this 
period (Principle 3).  The two families are now each offered a 5-year home improvement 
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loan for flood-proofing their homes at an interest rate of ten percent.  Each family now 
has to decide whether or not to undertake the measure.  
Recall that both families were reluctant to invest in mitigation measures for different 
reasons. The Andersons perceived the risk to be below their threshold level of concern; 
the Bensons faced budget constraints. If flood insurance were required as a condition for 
a mortgage, then a home improvement loan could encourage each family to invest in 
mitigation.  
Suppose the Anderson and Benson families are told that if they invest in mitigation, their 
annual premium over the next five years will be lowered due to the reduction in expected 
annual claims that the insurer pays each family – in this case $400 [i.e. 1/100 ($40,000)].i  
If each family takes a 5-year home improvement loan to cover the $1,200 mitigation cost 
at an interest rate of 7.5%, the annual loan cost will be $290. Thus there is a net saving to 
them of $110 (i.e., $400 - $290) for each of the next five years. From a financial 
viewpoint, this package should be attractive to both families. The key innovation would 
be to market the insurance and the home improvement loan as a package, with the 
combination paid off in annual premiums. 
If the new flood insurance premiums are now higher than before, an insurance voucher 
could be offered to current lower-income homeowners to reflect the unexpected increase 
(Principle 2). Over time, vouchers would eventually disappear as homes were re-sold 
except for those original families who retained ownership. The voucher would not 
preclude families from receiving a premium discount reflecting the reduced losses from 
future disasters due to investments in loss reduction measures.  
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Reframing the Problem of Risk 
Another complementary way to make people want to invest in protection today is to 
reframe the problem of risk so that people believe potential future disasters are above 
their threshold level of concern.  
Research shows that simply adjusting the time frame can have a significant impact on the 
perception of the risk.  For example, people were more willing to buckle their seat belts 
when they are told they had a one-in-three chance of an accident over a 50-year lifetime 
of driving, rather than a .00001 chance each trip.19  Similarly, property owners in a flood 
prone area are far more likely to take flood risk seriously if instead of being told the 
chance of a flood is 1 in 100 in any given year, that it has a greater than 1 in 5 chance of 
happening in the next 25 years.20  Such reframed risk information could be provided by 
insurers, realtors, and/or local, state and federal organizations concerned with reducing 
losses from disasters to encourage investments in risk reduction measures.  
Calling attention to the benefits of investing in mitigation measures by focusing on the 
reduction in losses from a specific storm such as Sandy or Katrina might attract more 
interest than a general message framed in terms of reducing damage from future 
hurricanes. Even before 9/11, controlled experiments revealed that consumers are willing 
to pay more for insurance against a plane crash caused by terrorists than for flight 
insurance due to any cause, a counterintuitive finding since by definition “any cause” 
includes a terrorist attack.21   
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IV. Encouraging Resilience through Other Initiatives 
Insurance can be complemented by several other initiatives that should lead families to 
better protect themselves.  
Well-Enforced Building Codes 
Building codes are another key component in ensuring that those residing in hazard-prone 
areas adopt cost-effective loss reduction measures. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 
Florida reevaluated its building code standards and in 1995, coastal areas of the state 
began to enforce high-wind design provisions for residential housing. The Florida 
Building Code 2001 edition, adopted in mid-2002, was accompanied by an extensive 
education and training program that included a requirement that all licensed engineers, 
architects, and contractors take a course on the new code.ii 
Hurricane Charley in 2004 demonstrated the effectiveness of the new statewide building 
code. One insurance company provided the Institute for Business and Home Safety 
(IBHS) with data on 5,636 policies in Charlotte County at the time this hurricane made 
landfall on August 13, 2004.  There were 2,102 reported claims from the hurricane (37 
percent of all the homeowners’ insurance policies in Charlotte County for this insurer). 
Figure 2 reveals that homes that met the wind-resistant standards enforced in 1996 had a 
claim frequency that was 60 percent less than those that were built prior to 1996.  
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FIGURE 2. AVERAGE CLAIM FREQUENCY BY BUILDING CODE CATEGORY FROM HURRICANE CHARLEY 
Source: Data from the Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) 
 
Moreover, this insurer’s average claim for pre-1996 homes was $24 per square foot, 
compared to $14 per square foot for those constructed between 1996 and 2004, as shown 
in Figure 3.  For a home of 2,000 square feet, the average damage before and after the 
new building code was implemented would be $48,000 and $28,000, respectively. In 
other words, the average reduction in claims from Hurricane Charley to each damaged 
home in Charlotte County built according to the newer code was approximately 
$20,000.22 
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FIGURE 3. AVERAGE CLAIM SEVERITY BY BUILDING CODE CATEGORY FROM HURRICANE CHARLEY 
Source: Data from the Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) 
 
IBHS released a new report in 2012 that provided an analysis of residential building 
codes in the 18 hurricane-prone coastal states along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic 
Coast.  While Florida scored 98 out of 100, other highly exposed states have a long way 
to go: Louisiana scored 73, New York 60, Alabama 18, Texas 18, and Mississippi 4.23  
Providing Mitigation Seals of Approval 
Homeowners who adopt cost-effective mitigation measures could receive a seal of 
approval from a certified inspector that the structure meets or exceeds building code 
standards. This requirement could either be legislated or imposed by the existing 
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) 
as a condition for obtaining a mortgage. Homeowners may want to seek such a seal of 
approval if they knew that insurers would provide a premium discount (similar to the 
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discounts that insurers now make available for smoke detectors or burglar alarms), and if 
home improvement loans were available for this purpose.  
A seal of approval could increase the property value of the home by informing potential 
buyers that damage from future disasters is likely to be reduced because the mitigation 
measure is in place. There are other direct financial benefits from having a seal of 
approval. Under the Fortified…for safer living program of the Institute for Business & 
Home Safety, an independent inspector, trained by IBHS, verifies that disaster resistance 
features have been built into the home that exceed the minimum requirement of building 
codes and may enable the property owner to receive homeowners’ insurance credits in 
some states.22 The success of such a program requires the support of the building industry 
and a sufficient number of qualified inspectors to provide accurate information as to 
whether existing codes and standards are being met or exceeded. Such a certification 
program can be very useful to insurers who may choose to provide coverage only to those 
structures that are given a certificate of disaster resistance. 
Evidence from a July 1994 telephone survey of 1,241 residents in six hurricane-prone 
areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts provides supporting evidence for some type of seal 
of approval. Over 90 percent of the respondents felt that local home builders should be 
required to adhere to building codes, and 85 percent considered it very important that 
local building departments conduct inspections of new residential construction.24  
Providing Local, State and Federal Tax Incentives  
Communities and cities should design their taxation systems to encourage residents to 
pursue cost-effective mitigation measures. In practice, communities often create a 
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monetary disincentive to invest in mitigation –  those who improve their home by making 
it safer are likely to have their property reassessed at a higher value based on the amount 
invested in the improvements and, hence, be required to pay higher taxes.  California has 
recognized this problem, and in 1990, voters passed Proposition 127, which exempts 
seismic rehabilitation improvements to buildings from reassessments that would increase 
property taxes.  
The city of Berkeley in California has taken an additional step to encourage home buyers 
to retrofit newly purchased homes by instituting a transfer tax rebate.  The city has a 1.5 
percent tax levied on property transfer transactions; up to one-third of this amount can be 
applied to seismic upgrades during the sale of property.  Qualifying upgrades include 
foundation repairs or replacement, wall bracing in basements, shear wall installation, 
water heater anchoring, and securing of chimneys. These measures have an additional 
external benefit to neighbors by their not being subject to damage from a collapsing 
house next door.   
South Carolina established Catastrophe Savings Accounts in 2007 that allow residents to 
set money aside, state income tax-free, to pay for qualified catastrophe expenses. The 
amount placed in the account reduces the taxpayer's South Carolina taxable income and, 
as a consequence, reduces the state income tax that the homeowner has to pay. A 
homeowner may deduct contributions to a Catastrophe Savings Account to cover losses 
to their legal residence against hurricane, rising floodwaters, or other catastrophic 
windstorm event damages.iii  
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South Carolina also offers tax credits for retrofitting, allowing individuals to take state 
income tax credits for costs to retrofit homes. In order to qualify for the tax credit, costs 
must not include ordinary repair or replacement of existing items. The homeowner may 
take a credit in any taxable year for costs associated with specific fortification measures 
as defined by the Director of Insurance.  In addition to obtaining tax credits for 
retrofitting properties in the mitigation process, consumers will also receive tax credits on 
the mitigation materials they buy. (For more details on this program see 
http://www.doi.sc.gov/faqs/CatSavingsAcct.htm.)  
Encouraging or Mandating Better Zoning  
After major catastrophes, there is often pressure at the local level to permit rebuilding to 
restore economic activity and tax revenue. In additional residents have emotional ties to 
their community. Local authorities should consider adopting zoning policies that do not 
permit rebuilding in damaged areas if the likelihood of another disaster is sufficiently 
high to merit these measures. If rebuilding is permitted, it should be conditional only 
upon effective mitigation and purchase of insurance with a premium set high enough to 
cover the expected costs of damages.  Insurance premiums that reflect high risk might be 
sufficient to deter inefficient rebuilding.  
The federal government could encourage state governments to undertake cost-effective 
mitigation and reconstruction measures by denying or limiting the availability of post-
disaster financial assistance to communities that fail to adopt and enforce such zoning 
policies.iv This might be difficult in the aftermath of a disaster when media coverage and 
political pressure for rebuilding damage communities is high, as politicians may focus on 
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short-term rewards.25 Making such policies explicit by law should help them in resisting 
such pressure.  
National Flood Insurance as a Prototype  
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 to provide flood 
insurance to homeowners and small businesses given the absence of private insurance. As 
of December 2012 it sold over 5.5 million policies and provided over $1.28 trillion in 
coverage. But it had to borrow a total of nearly $27 billion from the U.S. Treasury to 
meet its claims obligations in the aftermath of the 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2012 hurricane 
seasons.26,27 
An in-depth analysis of the entire portfolio of the NFIP revealed that the median tenure of 
flood insurance was between two and four years while the average length of time in a 
residence was seven years. As depicted in Table 1, of the 841,000 new policies purchased 
in 2001, only 73 percent were still in force one year later. By 2009 (eight years after 
2001), only 20 percent of them were still in place.28	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Table 1:  Duration of New NFIP Policies by Year after First Purchase -- 2001-2008 
 New Business Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Housing Units 841,000 876,000 1,186,000 986,000 849,000 1,299,000 974,000 894,000 
 1 year 73% 67% 77% 78% 76% 73% 74% 73% 
 2 years 49% 52% 65% 65% 63% 59% 58%   
 3 years 39% 44% 57% 55% 53% 48%   
 4 years 33% 38% 50% 48% 44%       
 5 years 29% 33% 44% 38%         
 6 years 25% 30% 33%           
 7 years 22% 26%             
8 years 20% 
       
 Sources:  Michel-Kerjan  et al,  2012. 
Surprisingly, homeowners allow their flood insurance to lapse even when they are 
required to have flood insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. Some 
banks and financial institutions have not enforced this regulation for at least two reasons: 
few banks have been fined and/or the mortgages are transferred to financial institutions in 
non-flood-prone regions of the country that have not focused on either the flood hazard 
risk or the requirement that homeowners may have to purchase this coverage. Only half 
of those residing in flood prone areas have flood insurance29,30.  
Introducing multi-year flood insurance tied to the structure rather than to the homeowner 
would ensure that exposed properties are covered over time. Should the homeowner 
move to another location, the flood insurance policy would remain with the property. 
Flood insurance should be required on all residences in flood-prone areas to avoid 
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disaster relief following the next major flood or hurricane. Ideally the cost of insurance 
would be included in the property tax bill so that this requirement is enforced.  
Premiums would be risk-based to reduce taxpayer subsidies, and fixed for a prespecified 
time period (e.g., 5 years) based on updated flood maps. Low-income homeowners 
currently residing in flood-prone areas whose premiums increased would be given a 
means-tested insurance voucher to reflect the difference. Homeowners who invested in 
mitigation measures would be given a premium discount to reflect the reduction in 
expected losses from floods whether or not they had an insurance voucher. Home 
improvement loans would encourage investments in cost-effective mitigation measures. 
Well-enforced cost-effective building codes and seals of approval would provide an 
additional rationale for undertaking these loss reduction measures.  
The reform of the National Flood Insurance Program in July 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) 
provides a starting point for implementing multi-year insurance programs coupled with 
the other initiatives described above. The legislation authorized studies by FEMA and the 
National Academy of Sciences to examine ways of incorporating risk-based premiums 
(Principle 1) and the feasibility of means-tested insurance vouchers (Principle 2).  
FEMA is also developing more accurate flood maps to set risk-based rates. The Biggert-
Waters Act authorizes $400 million per year for this purpose over fiscal years 2013-2017. 
For instance, prior to Hurricane Sandy, FEMA was restudying areas of the New Jersey 
and New York coastlines in order to update Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
(FIRMs).  Because existing FIRMs for these areas were developed more than 25 years 
ago, and updated FIRMs are not finalized, FEMA determined it is vital to provide near-
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term Advisory Base Flood Elevations (ABFEs) to support reconstruction efforts.  Home 
and business owners suffering damage from Sandy in communities adopting these 
ABFEs will be required to build higher and safer structures. This also means lower flood 
insurance premiums due to the reduced risk of water damage from future hurricanes.v 
V. Moving Forward 
Additional research is needed to design multi-year alternative risk transfer instruments 
for protection against catastrophic losses. Studies are also need to integrate insurance 
with other policy tools such as well-enforced building codes, zoning regulations, tax 
incentives and seals of approval to encourage investment in mitigation measures.  
One also needs to take into account the impact that climate change will have on future 
damage from flooding due to potential sea level rise and more intense hurricanes. Repetto 
and Easton31 have provided evidence that Federal agencies and other bodies have 
underestimated the risks of damage from extreme weather events due to climate change.   
Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Ranger32 show that enforcing building codes for all 
residences in Florida could reduce by nearly half the expected price of insurance under 
climate change projections, as they are likely to affect hurricane damage and the risk-
based price of insurance in Florida in 2020 and 2040. 
Based on these data, the case for making communities more resilient to natural disasters 
by investing in loss reduction measures now is an obvious one. Today, the general public 
is aware that we will face severe disasters in the future. The challenge facing the country 
is how to take advantage of the damage from Hurricane Sandy and the momentum 
created by the five-year renewal of the NFIP to take positive steps today rather than 
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regretting our inaction after the next hurricane or flood wreaks havoc. This will also 
reduce how much each of us as taxpayers will be asked to pay for disaster relief.33  
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i To keep the example simple we are assuming that insurance provides full coverage against future losses. 
In reality there will be a deductible so that the property owner will pay for some of the losses. We also 
assume reconstruction costs to be stable over time.  
ii More recent building codes were established in 2004, then in 2007.  See www.FloridaBuilding.org. 
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iii  Tax incentive programs such as this one should encourage homeowners to take out a larger deductible on 
their insurance policy and contribute more to the Catastrophe Savings Account.  In the process they pay 
lower insurance premiums and lower taxes at the same time. The insurer benefits by having lower claims 
following a disaster. If many homeowners take advantage of this program by raising their deductible, the 
insurer’s catastrophic exposure could be significantly reduced.  
iv	  Under the Stafford Act, the federal government covers 75 percent of the losses to public infrastructure. 	  
v	  More	  details	  on	  FEMA’s	  Advisory	  Base	  Flood	  Elevations	  (ABFE)	  program	  can	  be	  found	  in	  http://www.region2coastal.com/faqs/advisory-­‐bfe-­‐faq	  
